

TASKING

When a consumer of intelligence wants an answer to a question or wants to learn what is known in a specific area, there is no handbook to which he can turn which aids him in finding out how to go about it. Consequently, he goes about it on an ad hoc basis, learning what he can from others in his office and developing a trail of personal contacts within the intelligence community. A handbook (similar to, for example, the Fairfax County Handbook, which describes all of the Fairfax County government services available and tells the citizen how to avail himself of these services) written for the consumer, describing normal procedures for obtaining needed information from the intelligence community and all of the services available, would make it much easier for the consumer to work effectively with the intelligence community.

While some of the information which such a handbook should have is made available in briefings (e.g., Project Helpful, a briefing presented quarterly by DIA), one frequently does not retain a great deal from a briefing other than general impressions. Further, due to various circumstances, most consumers do not attend such briefings.

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UNCERTAINTY

25X1

[] Intelligence documents generally contain statements of two kinds. The first expresses the likelihood of some fact or some future event. The second gives a number such as the number of Warsaw Pact tanks in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA). Statements of the first kind (e.g. It is highly likely that the Soviets are storing nuclear weapons in the NGA) theoretically can be translated into numerical probabilities (e.g. highly likely = 0.9 or 90%) through the use of the Kent chart, (attached), thus ensuring that the intelligence analyst and the reader have the same understanding of the expression of likelihood. However, the Kent chart is in practice unsatisfactory. The probability should be given directly in the statement.

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[] For statements of the second kind (e.g. there are 15,000 Warsaw Pact tanks in the NGA) the intelligence community has yet to come up with a satisfactory expression for the uncertainty. While confidence intervals are occasionally given (e.g. $\pm 10\%$, or +300 tanks, - 400 tanks), the intelligence community generally does not state the likelihood that the true value falls within the confidence interval given. Yet the size of the confidence interval (e.g. $\pm 10\%$) must be a function of the likelihood (e.g. 90%) chosen. Statements of uncertainty are particularly important for the data being used by our MBFR negotiators. For example, the uncertainty in our figures for Warsaw Pact manpower in the NGA is probably greater than the reductions being negotiated.

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[] Because of consumer interest the intelligence community has produced some documents which describe in detail the intelligence background. An excellent example of this is "CIA/DIA Estimate of Warsaw Pact Nuclear Delivery Aircraft in the NATO Guidelines Area: the Intelligence Input,"

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[] 407816). This document reviews the basic intelligence evidence obtained, the process by which the conclusions were drawn, and gives a range of values that reflect uncertainty. The intelligence community should be encouraged to produce more documents of this sort.

DOWNGRADED TO:

CONFIDENTIAL on 31 Dec 1976

CLASSIFY on 31 Dec 1982

Classified by DASD(R&M)

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ESTIMATIVE TERMS AND DEGREES OF PROBABILITY

The table below explains the terms most frequently used to describe the range of likelihood in the key judgements of this estimate.

Order of Likelihood	Synonyms	Chances in 10	Per Cent
Near Certainty	virtually (almost) certain we are convinced, highly probable, highly likely	9	99 90
Probable	likely we believe we estimate chances are good it is probable that	8 7 6	60
Even Chance	chances are slightly better than even chances are about even chances are slightly less than even	5 4	40
Improbable	probably not unlikely we believe . . . not	3 2	10
Near Impossibility	almost impossible only a slight chance highly doubtful	1	1

NOTE: Words such as "perhaps", "may", and "might" will be used to describe situations in the lower ranges of likelihood. The word "possible", when used without further modification, will generally be used only when a judgement is important but cannot be given an order of likelihood with any degree of precision.

PRODUCT EVALUATION

There is a need for increased communication between the intelligence community and the intelligence consumer so that the various elements of the intelligence community can understand what is needed. Hindrances to this problem include a lack of travel funds, a lack of secure telephone communications facilities and other physical hindrances as well as a lack of initiative on the part of the consumer, the intelligence analyst, or both to make the effort to communicate. However, such a dialogue is essential if the intelligence community is to be able to learn from the consumer whether it is producing a useful product and how its product can be improved.

One cause of the lack of feedback is the reliance of the intelligence community on packaged products and packaged briefings designed to provide generalized information to a large number of customers, but not sharply focused on the concerns, interests or decision problems of any single major customer. This is of course necessary to some extent because the assets are not available to write a separate product for each customer. However, in current practice, products generally are prepared entirely within the intelligence community and are not furnished to major consumers for comment or criticism until after they have been published in their final coordinated (within the intelligence community) form. This practice is generally justified by the intelligence community on the basis of preventing the consumer from bending the intelligence (the threat) to provide undue support for his program or his point of view. Nevertheless, it also prevents the intelligence community from learning if the product does not address the right questions or does not present the information in a useful form. It seems that the better approach would be to staff all of the major intelligence products (major studies and analyses, not individual items) with the principal consumers at each point in the production process where the product undergoes a general review. A specific example of the lack of staffing with the consumer is the about to be published (it is at the printers) National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum, 25X1
 Arab Israeli Military Capabilities. It has recently been approved by the USIB without having been staffed within OSD (the present staffing of OSD comments on this document by OASD (I) will not affect the present publication; it will influence only a future update).

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

In many cases the intelligence community is tasked to provide data which requires not only intelligence data but also sophisticated analysis in its production. An example is a request for an estimate of the mobilization and reinforcement capabilities of the Warsaw Pact ground forces. Basic data (which requires only intelligence analysis) would include the peacetime location of units, their peacetime status, the type of training they undergo each year, and details of the rail or road transportation network, such as available track or highway and available rail cars and locomotives or transport vehicles. Operations analysis is required to transform this basic data into an estimate of the time required to place each unit in a wartime posture, ready (not necessarily fully ready) for combat, and transport it to a forward deployment location. In many cases the consumer of intelligence is as skilled as, or more skilled than, the intelligence community in performing the operations analysis.

A particular problem arises in the production of net assessment. If a different methodology is used to perform operations analysis of the same or similar functions performed by the Red and the Blue forces, then the conclusions of the net assessment can be biased by the difference in methodology. A specific example of this is the calculation of the sortie rate generation capability of U.S. and Soviet tactical fighter aircraft squadrons. The methodology used by U.S. planners differs substantially from that used by DIA analysts. Hence, a net assessment which uses these sortie rates furnished by the U.S. planners and by DIA to calculate the contribution of tactical aircraft to the theater war has a major built-in bias.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

WORKING GROUP

Agenda for the Tenth Meeting
1030 hours, 20 November 1974
White House Situation Room

Tab

Item 1 . Approval of the Minutes of the 30 October meeting
Copy of the draft minutes1

Item 2 . Critique of intelligence responsiveness to
consumer needs

D/DCI/IC letter of 2 November, "Agenda for a 20 Nov meeting"..2
This letter advised the 20 November focus would
be on this critique.
Comments in writing before the meeting were invited;
none have been received

Suggestions re "inputs" to stimulate discussion at
the 20 November meeting3
This paper was sent to all Working Group members
along with the minutes of the 30 October meeting

Talking paper for use in sustaining the critique4

BACKGROUND FOR RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IF THEY ARISE

"The fact of" satellite photographic reconnaissance
Working Group Chairman letter to NSCIC reporting Group
action on this topic5

Correspondence which led to making "the fact of x"
a Working Group item6

"Reactivation of the RAB as a Subcommittee of the NSCIC" 7

This may come up because it was discussed briefly
at the 30 October meeting.
At Tab is Dr. Clarke's memo to Mr. Colby, the letter
which Mr. Colby sent to Secretary of the Treasury
Simon, and the Dick Ober letter on which the DCI
letter was based.
No response has been received from Secretary Simon.
Further action on activation of the Economic Intel-
ligence Subcommittee is awaiting Mr. Simon's
designation of the Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger's memorandum of 10 October 1974, "Action
Program for the NSCIC Working Group" 8

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Approved For Release 2004/10/08 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050071-2

MATERIAL FOR HANDOUT TO WORKING GROUP MEMBERS AT THE END OF THE
CRITIQUE DISCUSSION

Memorandum for the Recomrd, "Congressional Status Report"9

This responds to Mr. Ober's comment at the 30
October meeting that it would be worthwhile for
the group to get a briefing on legislation which
might affect the Intelligence Community, other
than the proposal which the DCI had submitted to
the OMB.

"Economic Intelligence - An Action Program"10

Mr. Colby asked that this paper be sent to
the NSCIC. By separate memorandum you are
sending a copy to Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Ober
will be provided copies for dissemination to
the Economic Intelligence Subcommittee of the
NSCIC when it is formed.

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